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Abstract—This paper considers a category of rogue access
points (APs) that pretend to be legitimate APs to lure users to
connect to them. We propose a practical timing based technique
that allows the user to avoid connecting to rogue APs. Our
method employs the round trip time between the user and
the DNS server to independently determine whether an AP is
legitimate or not without assistance from the WLAN operator. We
implemented our detection technique on commercially available
wireless cards to evaluate their performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of IEEE 802.11 based wireless local area networks,
or WLANs, has grown in popularity in recent years. As peo-
ple’s expectation of ubiquitous wireless availability increases,
the security of such networks becomes more important. The
problem of rogue access points has emerged as an important
security problem in WLANs, as demonstrated by commercial
products [1], [2], [3] and academic research [4], [5], [6], [7]
devoted to this problem.
A rogue access point, or rogue AP, is an access point that is
not deployed by the WLAN administrator. A rogue AP can be
set up by connecting an AP directly into an Ethernet jack on
a wall, or by using two wireless interfaces. The ﬁrst interface
is connected to a real AP, and the other acts as an AP to lure
users. The differences between the two will be examined later
in the paper. In this paper, the term “rogue AP” refers to a
rogue AP that utilizes two wireless interfaces. In this scenario,
once a user is connected to a rogue AP, the adversary can
manipulate all data sent and received by the user, allowing
the adversary to launch different kinds of attacks.
Fig. 1. Illustration of Rogue AP Attacks: In our experiments, a rogue AP is
deployed at location A, B and C.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our rouge AP, we set
up the testbed shown in Fig. 1. The station laptop is placed in
an ofﬁce several meters away from a legitimate AP mounted
on the ceiling. The SINR of legitimate AP measured by the
station is 40dbm. We then setup the rogue AP and place it at
three separate locations A,B, and C. Location A is one meter
away from the station, location B is three meters away, and
location C is 6 meters away behind a wall. The goal is to
determine if we could induce the station to connect to the
rogue AP instead of the legitimate AP.
Table I shows the SINR values received by the station when
the rogue is placed at different locations. By default, the station
will select the AP with the highest SINR to connect to. In
our experiments, when the rogue AP’s SINR is greater than
40 dbm, it is highly likely that the station will be lured into
connecting with the rogue AP.
TABLE I
AVERAGE SINR UNDER DIFFERENT DISTANCE AND TX POWER
TX Power SINR (dbm)
(dbm) A( 1 m ) B( 3 m ) C (6m through a wall)
18 (default) 71 55 40
14 67 51 36
10 61 47 33
In this paper, we propose a rogue AP detection technique
that allows the user to independently determine whether an
AP is a legitimate or not without assistance from the WLAN
operator. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to
propose a rogue AP detection scheme that can be imple-
mented purely by end users. Our main contributions are: (1)
We propose a timing based rogue AP detection algorithm
that relies only on existing networking protocols to work,
and can be applied to any regular WLAN network without
requiring further modiﬁcations by network administrators. (2)
We consider a more powerful malicious adversary that actively
manages the rogue AP to avoid detection as opposed than an
“accidental” rogue AP deployed, for example, by an innocent
employee in an ofﬁce [8]. (3) We implement our scheme
using commercial off-the-shelf wireless cards and evaluate the
performance through real experiments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections II
and III discuss the related work, and problem formulation
respectively. Our algorithm is detailed in Section IV, and
our implementation is presented in Section V. We depict the
evaluation results in Section VI and conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
The threat of rogue APs have attracted the attention of
both commercial and academic researchers. One approach is
to deploy wireless sniffers to monitor wireless trafﬁc. Thesesniffers collect wireless trafﬁc and achieves the data for further
analysis. Work by [9], [8], [10] collected the MAC addresses
from the wireless trafﬁc and compares them against a database
of known MAC addresses. Unknown MAC addresses indicate
the presence of rogue APs. Since a malicious rouge AP can
spoof its MAC address, other researchers have focused on
using sniffers to collect RSS values [11], clock skews [12],
and radio frequency variations [13] to identify rogue APs.
Our solution differs from these work in that we do not require
installing and maintaining expensive sniffers.
Another approach analyzes network trafﬁc to detect the
presence of rogue APs [4], [5], [6]. Characteristics such as the
spacing between packets are different for a wired and wireless
network [14], [7]. Wireless standards such as CSMA/CA,
and physical properties like half duplex channels also help
distinguish wireless trafﬁc from wired trafﬁc [5], [6]. The
presence of wireless trafﬁc at a particular gateway where
there should be only wired trafﬁc will indicate the presence
of a rogue AP. A common requirement is to monitor trafﬁc
for the entire network. This is possible only in environments
such as corporate networks where cooperation with network
provider can be assumed. While our algorithm also relies on
unique wireless characteristics, the trafﬁc traces we use are
self generated. Our solution does not require the cooperation
of network service provider.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Problem Deﬁnition
We consider a scenario that a wireless station tries to join a
WLAN to access the Internet. After scanning the channels, the
station will discover multiple APs within its communication
range. Some of these APs are legitimate and some might
be rogue APs. Our objective is to design an algorithm that
helps the station detect the rogue AP. The detection algorithm
should be a complementary part to the existing AP selection
policy. Furthermore, the detection algorithm should function
in all IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks without further
modiﬁcations from the network administrator.
We assume that the rogue AP will be launched using a
mobile device with two wireless interfaces. The ﬁrst interface
connects the rogue AP to the legitimate AP. The second
interface pretends to be a legitimate AP to induce users to
connect to it. When a user associates with the rogue AP, the
rogue will forward packets from the second interface to the
ﬁrst interface, and then towards the legitimate AP. This way,
the user will still be able to access the Internet as if connected
to a real AP. Fig. 2 illustrates the setup.
We do not consider a rogue AP setup where the adversary
directly plugs the rogue AP into an Ethernet jack in the
wall. There are three reasons for this. First, there are a
limited number of available Ethernet jacks in public places
like airports, making this type of rogue APs less likely in such
places. Second, since these rogue APs must remain connected
to the Ethernet, they cannot move closer to users to increase
their SINR to induce people to connect to them, thus limiting
their impact. Finally, network administrators can conﬁgure the
network to disallow unknown devices from being assigned
IP addresses when plugged into the Ethernet network. In this
case, the rogue AP will be unable to provide Internet access
to the users, making them easy to be detected by the user.
Rogue AP
Legitimate AP
Fig. 2. This ﬁgure shows the setup for the rogue AP. A rogue AP is connected
to the wired network through a legitimate AP. Some stations inadvertently
connect to the rogue AP because the rogue AP is closer and broadcasts
stronger signals to them.
B. Malicious Adversary
Here we consider some defenses that can be circumvented
by a sophisticated adversary.
1) Identity veriﬁcation: Users can run programs like
traceroute to determine whether the connected AP
is a rogue AP. traceroute will return the number
of intermediate hops to a host site. From the output, the
station will learn that a suspicions AP exists in the route.
However, the rogue AP can evade detection by moni-
toring the wireless channel to learn the SSID and MAC
address of a legitimate AP, and then setup the rogue AP
to have the same parameters. The rogue can then avoid
forwarding the real AP’s reply to the user, thus giving
the impression that it is connected to the same gateway
as a legitimate AP.
2) Trafﬁc monitoring: Trafﬁc monitoring is a technique
to distinguish between wireless and wired trafﬁc. For
instance, [5] monitors all the trafﬁc at a gateway and
computes the interval between two consecutive TCP
ACK packets. A longer interval indicates that the TCP
packets are traveling over a wireless connection.
However, this technique cannot distinguish between a
legitimate AP and a rogue AP since both utilize a
wireless link.
3) Simple timing: The station may use the timing infor-
mation such as the round trip time (RTT) to detect a
rogue AP. Since the rogue AP consists of an additional
wireless link to the legitimate AP, this may lead to a
delay when transmitting data. The station can determine
the RTT by sending a message such as a ping request
or TCP data packets [14] and waiting for a reply.
However, the rogue AP can simply create a response to
return to the user, thus avoiding the time penalty of the
additional wireless link. For instance, the rogue AP can
generate a ping response to return to the user without
forwarding the request to the real AP. Similarly whenthe user sends a TCP packet, the rogue AP can return
the ACK to the user directly.
IV. OUR PROTOCOL
Our rogue AP detection protocol also uses a timing informa-
tion based on round trip time (RTT). We begin with examining
the motivation and challenges of our approach, followed by
some background discussion. We then propose our protocol
and examine the parameter values.
A. Motivation and Challenges
There are two reasons for using RTT as a basis for our
protocol. First, when a user connects to the network via a rogue
AP, all his packets traverse two wireless hops, one between
the user and the rouge AP, and the other between the rogue
AP and the real AP. When the user is communicating with a
real AP, there is only one wireless hop. This additional hop
will introduce an unavoidable time latency assuming that the
rogue is forced to communicate with the real AP.
We believe the RTT-based method is suitable for rogue
AP detection due to the following reasons. First, measuring
RTTs is able to distinguish the route through a rogue AP
with that through a legitimate AP. Comparing these two cases,
the difference is that the route from the user to the server
via a rogue AP needs an extra wireless transmission before
reaching the wired network. Similarly, the response from the
server has to pass one more wireless link through the rogue
AP. Considering the channel contention delay and relatively
low transmitting rate, the wireless transmission consumes
the dominate part in the RTT. Therefore, two extra wireless
transmissions can yield a visible difference in the measured
RTTs. Second, it is feasible and easy for the user to measure
RTTs. Unlike non-timing methods mentioned in related work,
measuring RTTs does not need any special equipments, such
as sniffers [1], [2] or radio frequency analyzers [15]. It does
not require modiﬁcation at server or AP side.
However, applying RTT-based method is not straightfor-
ward. It has to address the following three issues in order
to effectively detect the rogue AP. (1) The ﬁrst issue is which
server to contact. A server in the local network is preferred
over a remote server in the Internet because the RTT-based
method is sensitive to the delay in the wired network. Probing
a remote server may cause a signiﬁcant variance of RTT
due to the dynamic routing path and Internet trafﬁc. (2) The
second issue is what probing message to use. We want a
probing message that cannot be easily manipulated by the
rogue AP and can certainly reach the server in any network
setting. As we mentioned earlier, a simple ping message can
be easily returned by the rogue AP to evade detection and
might be blocked by some network administrators. In addition,
our probing message has to adhere to the existing networking
protocols so as to avoid requiring assistance from the network
provider. (3) Finally, we have to consider the effect of network
trafﬁc conditions. A busy channel may adversely affect RTT
timing and lead to incorrect rogue AP detection.
B. Background
In our solution, we use DNS lookup and answer to solve the
ﬁrst and second issues above, and we use 802.11 management
frames, probe request and response in particular, to tackle the
third problem.
DNS lookup and answer: The basic function of DNS is
to provide a distributed database that maps human-readable
host names (such as www.cs.wm.edu) to IP addresses (such
as 128.239.26.64). The nodes managing this distributed
database are called DNS servers that serve to answer the
lookup request for speciﬁed host names. To achieve high
performance of DNS lookup, caching the queried records is
extensively used in current networks.
Typical DNS lookup can be classiﬁed into two types:
recursive query, and nonrecursive query. In a recursive DNS
lookup, a station queries a local server for a host name. If
this server cannot answer the query, it will contact the root
DNS server which will then recursively ask other servers to
determine the IP address. For a nonrecursive query, the local
DNS server will only search the cached records locally without
contacting the root DNS server. If no match is found, the local
server will send a “no such host name” message back to the
station.
In our algorithm, we use nonrecursive query as the probing
message to measure the RTT between the user and the DNS
server. The user will send a DNS lookup request for a host
name with the nonrecursive option. The host name may be a
known host name or non-existing name. Then the user waits
for the response from the local DNS server and measures the
RTT by subtracting the transmitting time from the time of
receiving the answer. The user repeats this process with a
different host name each time.
Our proposed scheme is efﬁcient since most local networks
will have a local DNS server or resolver for performance
reasons [16]. Therefore, a station can always send a request to
the local DNS server and the time spent on the wired network
is small due to the local communication. Furthermore, DNS
is required by all networks, and thus unlike ping messages,
cannot be blocked by network providers. Finally, the DNS
response varies for different queries. The adversary cannot
predict in advance what the user may choose to query, nor
determine whether a particular query can be satisﬁed by the
actual DNS server. The adversary that returns an incorrect
reply will be detected by the user. As a result, the adversary
must forward the request to the real DNS server to ensure that
the reply is correct.
Besides, since the radio range of a station is limited, it is
not unreasonable to assume all APs (including rogue APs)
detected by the station belong to the same network, and use
one common DNS server. The answers of DNS lookup from
those APs should be the same. Thus, by comparing results
from tested APs, we can suspect the APs that always reply “no
such host name” as rogues. In an alternative way, a station can
pick an AP to make the DNS server cache some DNS queries
beforehand, and then test the remaining APs. This strategyalso forces a rogue AP to forward the request.
Probe request and response: To determine the wireless
trafﬁc conditions, we measure another RTT using probe
request and probe response messages. These messages are
typically used when a station is scanning for APs to connect.
There are two advantages to use probe request and response.
First, by calculating the durations between these two packets,
we can estimate the channel trafﬁc and the AP’s workload. If
the channel is busy, both the probe request and response will
take a long time to transmit due to channel contention and
retransmission after signal collisions. In addition, if the AP is
heavily loaded, i.e., the AP is sending many packets for other
associated stations, the probe response message has to wait
in the AP’s transmission queue for a long time before being
sent out. Second, in practice, it is difﬁcult for a smart rogue
AP to fake a busy channel condition by intentionally delaying
the probe response for a long time, since wireless card driver
does not dispatch this kind of low level management frame to
OS, and the rogue AP cannot control probe packets without
modifying drivers.
The regular probe request, however, is not perfectly suitable
for our scheme because it is a broadcast message and will
be replied by every AP that hears it. This leads to multiple
responses that create unnecessary channel contention and
biased RTT measurements. Furthermore, a broadcast message
does not have any retransmission. If the associated AP does
not receive probe request correctly, the station will not receive
the probe response. One possible solution is to apply a timeout
mechanism at the higher layer to retransmit the probe request.
However, it may incur a large overhead. Thus, we modify the
probe request packet to be a unicast message. We put the MAC
address of the target AP into the destination ﬁeld in the probe
request so that only the AP in consideration will reply. This
also ensures that the target AP will reply MAC layer ACK in
case of successful delivery and otherwise the retransmission
is enabled.
C. Protocol
In this subsection, we present the overview of our rogue AP
detection scheme. We use sta to indicate a station. For a given
APx within sta’s communication range, the station runs the
following Algorithm 1 to determine whether APx is a rogue
AP.
Our algorithm consists of two phases. The ﬁrst phase (lines
2-5) is to measure the RTTs, and the second phase (lines 6-
15) is to analyze the collected RTTs and decide if the current
tested AP is rogue. In the ﬁrst phase, the station repeatedly
sends a probe request (line 3) and a DNS lookup (line 4)
for n rounds. Respectively, RTTprobe (RTTdns) records the
round trip time between probe (dns) request and the response.
Note that we subtract the data transmission time Tdata from
both RTTprobe and RTTdns, because probe packets and DNS
packets have different packet sizes and transmission rates,
and may vary in each round. After eliminating the effects
caused by data transmission time, we can fairly compare
RTTprobe and RTTdns. The details of how to calculate Tdata
Algorithm 1 Detecting Rogue AP (APx)
1: Connect and associate with APx
2: for i =1to n do
3: Send unicast probe request to APx, record round trip
time RTTprobe = RTTprobe − Tdata(probe).
4: Send DNS lookup to local DNS server, record round
trip time RTTdns = RTTdns − Tdata(dns).
5: end for
6: Filter outliers
7: RTTprobe = Mean of remaining RTTprobe
8: RTTdns = Mean of remaining RTTdns
9: σprobe = Standard deviation of remaining RTTprobe
10: σdns = Standard deviation of remaining RTTdns
11: Δt = RTTdns − RTTprobe
12: θ = f(σprobe,σ dns)
13: if Δt>θthen
14: APx is a rogue AP
15: end if
are discussed in next subsection. The number of rounds n is
another important parameter capturing the tradeoff between
the overhead and accuracy. Larger n incurs a larger overhead,
but increases the detection accuracy. According to our exper-
imental observations, n = 100 will yield sufﬁciently accurate
results. In the second phase, we ﬁrst ﬁlter out some outlier
RTTs (line 6). Due to the page limit, we omit the details
of this ﬁltering process. After that, we calculate the mean
value (lines 7-8) and standard deviation (lines 9-10) of both
RTTprobe and RTTdns. Finally, in lines 11-15, we check the
difference between these two RTTs Δt (line 11) against a
threshold parameter θ (line 12) to determine if this is a rogue
AP. The threshold θ which reﬂects the delay induced by the
extra wireless transmissions in rogue AP case, is calculated by
σprobe and σdns according to experimental measurements. We
will present the details of function f in the next subsection.
D. Parameter values
Here, we explain how to derive Tdata and θ in Algorithm 1.
We begin with a quick review of the 802.11 protocol.
IEEE 802.11 medium access control adopts CSMA/CA
model and the distributed coordination function (DCF). Before
transmitting a frame, a station ﬁrst senses whether the channel
is idle. If the channel is busy, the frame transmission will
be deferred until the channel becomes available. After the
channel is free for certain period of time, which is deﬁned
as DIFS, the station starts a back-off operation with a slot
counter whose value is randomly selected between 0 and the
size of a contention window (CWmin). This back-off counter
decreases by one for each idle slot time. When the back-off
counter becomes zero, the station transmits the frame. When
the destination receives the frame successfully, it sends a MAC
layer ACK back to notify the sender. If the sender does not
receive an ACK, it will retransmit the packet. Table II lists
some timing parameters in 802.11 standard that we will use
later.TABLE II
IEEE 802.11 CHARACTERISTICS
Parameters Values
802.11b 802.11g 802.11a
tslot 20 μs 9 μs 9 μs
tDIFS 50 μs 34 μs 28 μs
tPCLP 192/96 μs 192/96 or 20 μs 20 μs
CWmin 31 15 15
Based on 802.11 mechanism, we can express the delay for
transmitting a packet as
Tdelay = tDIFS + tbf + tdefer + Tdata + tretransmit,
where tdefer is the time deferred due to the busy channel
medium, tretransmit is the time for retransmission if no ACK
is received, and tbf is the random back-off time. The expected
value of tbf is given by
tbf =
CWmin
2
· tslot.
Data transmission time Tdata depends on the data size (L-
byte payload) and the transmitting rate (r Mbps),
Tdata(L,r)=tPCLP +
(28 + L) · 8bits
r
,
where tPCLP is the physical layer packet overhead of any
IEEE 802.11 packet including two parts: the Physical Layer
Convergence Protocol (PCLP) preamble used for synchroniza-
tion and the PCLP header. According to the standard, TPCLP
is 192μs (96μs) for long (short) preamble, using ERP-DSSS
modulation scheme (supporting 1-11 Mbps). And TPCLP is
20μs, using ERP-OFDM modulation scheme (supporting 6-
54 Mbps). Value 28 is the length of MAC header plus CRC
checksum. For every measured RTT at each round, the station
is aware of the data size (L) and transmitting rate (r) for every
incoming and outgoing packet. It thus can compute the exact
values of Tdata(probe) and Tdata(dns), and subtract them
from RTTs to eliminate the effect of different transmission
time.
In order to derive θ, we need analyze and express the RTTs.
For a legitimate AP, the path taken for a probe is
STA → AP → STA,
and the path taken for a DNS lookup and answer is
STA → AP → SERV → AP → STA.
For simplicity, we only consider the network overhead, and
ignore the time for AP an DNS server to process the packets.
There, after subtracting Tdata, these two RTTs for probe and
DNS can be expressed as
RTTprobe ≈ T
sta→ap
overhead + T
ap→sta
overhead
and
RTTdns ≈ T
sta→ap
overhead + Twired + T
ap→sta
overhead,
where Toverhead is used to indicate the remaining part of
Tdelay after deducting Tdata. Since the RTTs of DNS and
probe are measured at approximately the same time, we
assume the network conditions are stable during that time
period1, so that we regard Toverhead of probe and DNS as
the same, and the difference between the two RTTs is
Δt = RTTdns − RTTprobe = Twired.
Considering the efﬁciency of DNS query, a local DNS server
cannot locate too far away from stations in local network.
Based on our extensive experimental measurements (which
will be shown later in Section VI), Δt is no larger than 1m,
even when we consider 5 hops between sending a DNS lookup
and receiving the answer back in the idle network trafﬁc
condition.
On the other hand, if the tested AP is a rogue AP, the path
taken for a probe is still
STA → RAP → STA,
but the path for DNS is
STA → RAP → AP → SERV → AP → RAP → STA.
Similarly, we get
Δt  = RTTdns − RTTprobe
= T
rap→ap
delay + Twired + T
ap→rap
delay .
For a station, it is difﬁcult to estimate Tdelay between the rogue
AP and its associated legitimate AP, since the station does not
know the transmitting rate and network condition at the AP
side. However, based on our experiments, we observe that Δt 
is larger than 1ms in the idle trafﬁc condition, even when the
rogue AP transmits with the maximum rate of 54Mbps. For our
Algorithm 1 to effectively detect a rogue AP, θ ideally needs
to be set between Δt and Δt  as Δt<θ<Δt . Therefore,
we set the threshold θ to 1ms for the idle trafﬁc condition.
Next, we consider the scenarios where the network trafﬁc
and AP’s workload are heavy. Both Δt for a legitimate AP and
Δt  for a rouge AP will deﬁnitely increase, since the heavy
trafﬁc and workload congest the AP causing long tx queues,
packet loss, and retransmissions. Thus, the corresponding
response time becomes longer. Recall the process of DNS
request, when an AP receives a DNS lookup, it will send the
request to the DNS server, and wait for the answer. When
the trafﬁc is heavy, many packets will be queued in the AP
during the waiting time, thus the DNS answer will not be sent
by the AP until all packets ahead are transmitted. Especially
in the rogue AP case, the additional wireless hop will make
Δt  much larger. Therefore, the threshold 1ms set in the idle
trafﬁc condition is too small to be effective in the heavy
trafﬁc condition. In our solution, we dynamically adjust the
threshold θ according to the standard deviation of RTTprobe
and RTTdns. Based on our experiments, we observe that
the standard deviation of measured RTTs in the heavy trafﬁc
condition is larger than that in low trafﬁc condition. Fig. 3
1[17] mentions that wireless network trafﬁc remains stable within approx-
imately 150 − 250 ms in practice.illustrates the mean value against the average standard devi-
ation of measured RTTs in our extensive experiments under
different trafﬁc loads. As we can see, using a line starting
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Fig. 3. Mean value of Δt against the average standard deviation of
RTTprobe and RTTdns under different trafﬁc load condition
from (0,1) (initial threshold 1ms for the idle trafﬁc condition)
with slope 0.41, we can distinguish between legitimate AP and
rogue AP in most of the tested cases. Therefore, we set
θ = f(σprobe,σ dns)=0 .41 ·
σprobe + σdns
2
+1 .0 (1)
Recall in Algorithm 1, after measuring the two RTTs, a station
computes the Δt and corresponding θ, according to the mean
value and standard deviation of RTTdns and RTTprobe.I f
Δt>θ , the station will mark the AP it connects to as a rogue
AP. Then the station should choose another AP for test. An
alternative way is to compare the difference (Δt) of all the
nearby APs, and classify those APs into different categories
according to the value of Δt. Rogue APs must belong to a
isolated set. We will investigate this approach in our future
work.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND SETUP
A. Hardware description
Fig. 4 illustrates the infrastructure of our testbed which
consists of two APs and three laptops: one laptop is used
as a trafﬁc generator, and the remaining laptops serve as the
station and rogue AP. Server A is the DNS server in our
campus network. To investigate the effect of wired link on our
algorithm, we set another DNS server B in the same subnet
of APs.
Fig. 4. Illustration of the architecture of the testbed
The hardware speciﬁcation of each component is described
as follows.
(a) Access Points: We used a Linksys WPA54G and D-
Link DI-624+A for our APs. Both APs operate in the 802.11g
mode.
(b) Wireless Stations: All laptops in Fig. 4 are 2GHz x86
machines running Linux 2.6x kernel. The trafﬁc generator and
station are equipped with a TP-Link TL-WN610G wireless
card while the rogue AP possesses 2 wireless cards, one TP-
Link TL-WN610G, and the other Intel 3495ABG.
(c) DNS server: DNS server B is a desktop computer
connected in local wired network running dnsmasq.
B. Software Description
(a) Drivers: We use Madwiﬁ v0.9.4 driver [18] for the wire-
less cards with Atheros chipset and ipw3945 v1.2.2 driver [19]
for those with Intel chipset.
(b) Click toolkit on station: On the station side, we im-
plement the proposed algorithm using Click [20] toolkit with
the wireless card turned into promiscuous mode. We inject
our codes into the Click modules to record accurate system
time (in microseconds) when a probe request (DNS lookup)
is pushed to transmit queue of wireless interface, and when
the probe response (DNS answer) is received successfully
(corresponding interrupt handler is called). We also implement
our own unicast probe request. The comparison between two
probe requests are shown in Fig 5.
Frame
Control Duration 00:17:9A:68:9A:91 SA BSS ID Seq ctl
MAC header
2 2 6 6 6 2
bytes
MAC address of AP
Frame
Control Duration FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF SA BSS ID Seq ctl
MAC header
2 2 6 6 6 2
bytes
Unmodified probe request
Our probe request
Fig. 5. MAC header comparison between unmodiﬁed probe request and our
probe request
(c) Iptables and Macchanger on the rogue AP: For
the rogue AP, one of its wireless cards is conﬁgured to work
in the AP mode in order to attract the station, and the other
wireless card is turned to the station mode and connects to a
legitimate AP. We use a tool called macchanger to spoof the
MAC address of a legitimate AP. A station connected to the
rogue AP will be assigned an IP address as if it obtains it
from a legitimate AP.
Tunneling the two interfaces of the rogue AP is achieved by
adding rules in iptables. The adversary’s strategies mentioned
before are implemented by netﬁlter/iptables.
(d) Trafﬁc load: We use channel utilization as in [21] to
quantify the trafﬁc load. Particularly, the channel utilization
during a certain period of time is computed by adding (1) thetime spent by the on-air transmission of all data (including
retransmitting), management, and control frames, and (2)
the overhead for each frame, such as DIFS and SIFS. This
overhead is a part of channel utilization, since the channel
remains unavailable in that period. In our testbed, the trafﬁc
generator sends constant bit rate (CBR) packets to generate
the required channel utilization (trafﬁc load).
VI. EVALUATION
Here, we present the experimental results of our rouge AP
detection scheme. For all our experiments, we use the setup
found in Fig 4.
A. Data transmission rate
We begin with investigating whether a rogue AP can ma-
nipulate its transmission rate to avoid detection. Most wire-
less devices adopt rate adaptation algorithms to adjust their
transmission rate with respect to changing wireless conditions.
However, since there are no speciﬁcations with regards to rate
adaptation in 802.11 networks, the rogue AP is free to use any
802.11 transmission rate to try to avoid detection. The idea is
that a rouge may attempt to always use the highest rate when
connected to a legitimate AP so as to reduce the RTT.
TABLE III
COMPARISON BETWEEN RATE ADAPTATION AND FIXED 54MBPS IN IDLE
TRAFFIC AND GOOD CHANNEL QUALITY CONDITIONS
RAP Average RTT after removing outliers (ms)
Rate RTTprobe 0.661 0.659 0.659 0.66 0.657
adaptation RTTdns 1.827 1.826 1.795 1.789 1.825
Δt 1.166 1.167 1.126 1.129 1.168
θ 1.028 1.023 1.021 1.031 1.027
Fixed RTTprobe 0.661 0.663 0.656 0.664 0.661
54Mbps RTTdns 1.789 1.826 1.785 1.831 1.78
Δt 1.128 1.163 1.129 1.167 1.119
θ 1.021 1.027 1.026 1.037 1.020
To test, we ﬁrst set up a rouge AP to use the default rate
adaptation in idle trafﬁc condition when connecting to AP A,
and run our detection algorithm. We then repeat the experiment
using the same trafﬁc conditions, except we set the rogue
AP to always use the highest possible transmission rate of
54Mbps. In both tests, we set n = 100 and use DNS server B.
Table III shows the results for the two tests, where RTTprobe
(RTTdns) is average RTT between probe (DNS) request and
the response minus the data transmission time (see lines 7-8 in
Algorithm 1), Δt = RTTdns −RTTprobe, and θ is computed
according to Eq.(1). In our algorithm, if Δt>θ , the tested
AP is identiﬁed as rogue; otherwise as legitimate. We observe
that (1) even if the rogue AP were set to always send at the
highest possible rate, we can still detect the rogue AP, and
(2) the performance gain by the rogue AP in using a ﬁxed
rate appears to be minor, since rate adaptation can quickly
converge to use the best possible rate even if the initial rate is
much lower. In fact, in a practical environment, using a ﬁxed
rate may result in worse performance since more packets will
be dropped when trafﬁc conditions ﬂuctuates. This is seen in
the larger Δt values in ﬁxed rate experiments. These results
are omitted due to page limitations. Lastly, since utilizing a ﬁx
rate yields no beneﬁts, we let the rogue AP use rate adaptation
for the rest of our experiments.
B. Location of DNS server
A variable that may affect the RTT timings is the location
of the DNS server. A DNS server that is more hops away from
a station may lead to larger RTT values, or vice versa. Thus, a
close DNS server will make rogue AP difﬁcult to be detected,
and a far away DNS server will cause legitimate AP to be
falsely identiﬁed as rogue.
To illustrate the delay introduced by multiple hops, we send
64 byte packets to a local host located at two, four, and ﬁve
hops away from the station, and measure the time taken for
the host to respond. Fig. 6 shows the results. We ﬁnd that the
time delay resulting from additional hops is very small.
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Fig. 6. Delay for transmitting 64 byte packets via different number of hops
on wired link. t is the mean of delay, and Δ is the variance.
Next, we test our detection algorithm when rogue APs
connect to different DNS servers in idle trafﬁc condition. In
the ﬁrst test, we let the legitimate AP and the rogue AP both
use DNS server A (see Fig. 4). Packets sent by the station need
3 wired hops to reach the DNS server, and 2 wired hops for
the response back. In the second test, we have both legitimate
and rogue AP connect to DNS server B which is located in
the same subnet. Table IV show the results. We see that our
algorithm is able to detect the rogue AP even when the DNS
server is located at different places.
C. Wireless Trafﬁc
Here we examine the effects of wireless trafﬁc on our
detection algorithm. Since we adopt a timing based approach,
variations in network trafﬁc may adversely affect our results.
To evaluate, we set the rogue AP to use the most favorable
conditions to avoid detection. The rogue AP can best avoid
detection when it can connect the station to the real AP as
fast as possible. We let the connection between the rogue AP
and the AP A (Fig 4) be free of any trafﬁc, thus ensuring the
fastest possible transmission between the rogue AP and real
AP. This connection is set to channel 11. We then test the
rogue AP against AP B, both of which are set to channel 1.TABLE IV
AVERAGE RTT FOR DNS SERVER UNDER IDLE TRAFFIC SITUATION
Average RTT after removing outliers (ms)
Legitimate RTTprobe 0.633 0.633 0.632 0.634 0.634
AP A RTTdns 1.152 1.151 1.148 1.156 1.130
Δt 0.519 0.518 0.516 0.522 0.025
(Server A) θ 1.014 1.015 1.016 1.016 1.203
Rogue RTTprobe 0.671 0.663 0.664 0.664 0.661
AP RTTdns 2.151 2.219 2.452 2.371 2.455
Δt 1.48 1.556 1.788 1.707 1.794
(Server A) θ 1.057 1.045 1.057 1.062 1.062
Legitimate RTTprobe 0.632 0.633 0.633 0.632 0.632
AP RTTdns 0.691 0.687 0.691 0.687 0.692
Δt 0.059 0.054 0.058 0.055 0.06
(Server B) θ 1.004 1.004 1.003 1.003 1.004
Rogue RTTprobe 0.661 0.659 0.659 0.66 0.657
AP RTTdns 1.827 1.826 1.795 1.789 1.825
Δt 1.166 1.167 1.126 1.129 1.168
(Server B) θ 1.028 1.023 1.021 1.031 1.027
We use a separate laptop as a trafﬁc generator to control the
amount of trafﬁc. We experiment over three trafﬁc conditions,
idle trafﬁc, half-saturated trafﬁc, and saturated trafﬁc. In all
experiments, we set n = 100 and use DNS server A.
Idle trafﬁc: Fig. 7 describes the empirical CDF of RTT
for legitimate AP and rogue AP measured in one experiment.
The complete results are listed in Table IV. As we can see,
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Fig. 7. Empirical CDF of RTT for legitimate AP A and rogue AP in idle
trafﬁc situation, while DNS server is A, transmission rate is automatic, and
n = 100.
the value of Δt is small, and the θ varies a little in idle trafﬁc
situation. For the legitimate AP, all Δt are smaller than 1ms,
whereas all Δt for the rogue AP are larger than 1ms. Our
scheme achieves nearly 100% accuracy, and the total detection
time is no longer than 1s.
Half-saturated trafﬁc: We deﬁne a half-saturated trafﬁc
condition when the ratio of on-air time of all transmitted
packets to the total time is 45%. The trafﬁc generator will
periodically send packets to AP B to create this condition.
The experiment is then repeated to test our algorithm. We
ﬁnd that as the trafﬁc load increases, the average RTT for
both probe and DNS messages also increase. At the same
time, our algorithm is still able to identify rogue AP with
high probability. Fig. 8 illustrates CDF for one experiment.
The details are described in Table V.
Saturated trafﬁc: Here, we let the trafﬁc generator send
enough packets to create a 90% channel utilization before
starting the experiments. Fig. 9 and Table VI describe the
results. We ﬁnd that under heavy trafﬁc conditions, the RTT
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Fig. 8. Empirical CDF of RTT for legitimate AP B and rogue AP in
half saturated trafﬁc situation, while DNS server is A, transmission rate is
automatic, and n = 100.
TABLE V
AVERAGE RTT IN HALF SATURATED TRAFFIC SITUATION
Average RTT after removing outliers (ms)
Legitimate RTTprobe 1.895 1.67 2.009 1.664 1.787
AP B RTTdns 2.788 3.486 3.291 3.415 3.133
Δt 0.893 1.816 1.282 1.751 1.346
(Server A) θ 1.956 1.972 2.025 1.986 1.985
Rogue RTTprobe 1.744 2.067 2.69 2.749 1.982
AP RTTdns 4.692 4.77 6.215 6.222 4.838
Δt 2.948 2.703 3.525 3.473 2.856
(Server A) θ 2.021 2.034 2.296 2.356 2.072
variance for both probe request and DNS lookup are very
large. The values range from several milliseconds to hundreds
of milliseconds. As a result, some of the legitimate APs may
be incorrectly classiﬁed as a rogue AP.
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Fig. 9. Empirical CDF of RTT for legitimate AP B and rogue AP in saturated
trafﬁc situation, while DNS server is A, transmission rate is automatic, and
n = 100.
TABLE VI
AVERAGE RTT IN SATURATED TRAFFIC SITUATION
Average RTT after removing outliers (ms)
Legitimate RTTprobe 37.78 41.07 52.55 54.63 29.36
AP B RTTdns 38.46 45.22 61.28 64.43 41.72
Δt 0.68 4.15 8.73 9.80 12.36
(Serv A) θ 7.70 11.57 14.12 13.49 9.56
Rogue RTTprobe 53.04 63.18 67.34 59.18 54.95
AP RTTdns 69.13 82.34 79.46 77.59 69.36
Δt 16.09 19.16 12.12 18.41 14.41
(Serv A) θ 12.42 13.29 11.73 12.86 15.33
D. Number of samples
Previously, we found that our algorithm does not work
well when the wireless trafﬁc is saturated. Here, we explore
the effects of testing more times. In other words, we want
to determine the effects when we increase from the originalvalue n = 100 to larger n values. We test the legitimate AP
and rogue AP separately under different channel utilization.
Both tests are repeated 10 times. The detection accuracy is the
ratio of the number of the tests in which the AP is correctly
identiﬁed over a total of 20 times. Fig. 10 illustrates the
accuracy against channel utilization.
We ﬁnd that using n = 100 achieves 100 percent of detec-
tion accuracy in low trafﬁc situation. However, the accuracy
falls to 65% as the channel becomes increasingly saturated.
When we set n = 300, we are able to obtain 80% as the
channel saturation increases.
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Fig. 10. Detection accuracy against channel utilization
E. Detection time
The detection time is the total amount of time a user has
to wait for our algorithm to ﬁnish executing. This value is
approximately the average RTT multiplied by sample size.
When there is heavy trafﬁc, the average RTT increases, and
thus the total detection time also increases. Also, we may need
to use a larger value for n in heavy trafﬁc which also increases
the detection time. Table VII shows the detection time for
detecting each AP under different trafﬁc conditions. We omit
the time needed to associate with an AP and obtain an IP
address since both are necessary regardless of which AP is
selected.
TABLE VII
DETECTION TIME UNDER DIFFERENT NETWORK TRAFFIC CONDITION
Detection time (second)
Idle Half saturated Saturated
n = 100 0.2 0.9 11.3 AP
0.3 1.1 17.2 RAP
n = 300 0.5 2.7 39.1 AP
0.8 3.2 50.7 RAP
VII. CONCLUSION
The ease of setting up a successful rogue AP makes
this form of wireless attack a particularly serious security
problem. While existing techniques can alleviate this threat,
they nonetheless require active participation on the part of the
network administrator. In this paper, we present a practical,
timing based scheme for the end user to avoid connecting
to rogue APs. This is done without any assistance from
the network administrator. We implement our approach on
commercially available hardware for evaluation.
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